Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions
在资本结构权衡模型中纳入管理者乐观和过度自信特质，发现这些特质促使管理者选择更高债务水平，但能通过减少管理者与股东、股东与债权人之间的冲突来提升企业价值。
Abstract This article incorporates well-documented managerial traits into a tradeoff model of capital structure to study their impact on corporate financial policy and firm value. Optimistic and/or overconfident managers choose higher debt levels and issue new debt more often but need not follow a pecking order. The model also surprisingly uncovers that these managerial traits can play a positive role. Biased managers' higher debt levels restrain them from diverting funds, which increases firm value by reducing this manager-shareholder conflict. Although higher debt levels delay investment, mildly biased managers' investment decisions can increase firm value by reducing this bondholder-shareholder conflict.