The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement
构建并检验了反垄断执法下的合约定价模型，发现卡特尔的最优价格介于竞争价格与无执法时的垄断价格之间，实证表明加强执法并配合高额损害赔偿威胁能有效降低面包行业的加价幅度。
In this paper we formulate and test a model of collusive pricing in the presence of antitrust enforcement. We show that a cartel's optimal price is likely to be neither the competitive price nor the price that the cartel would set in the absence of antitrust enforcement but rather an intermediate price that depends on the levels of antitrust enforcement efforts and penalties. Our empirical results reveal that increasing antitrust enforcement in the presence of a credible threat of large damage awards has the deterrent effect of reducing mark-ups in the bread industry.