The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe
基于11国675家上市公司数据，发现家族控制并不损害企业绩效，创始人控制及后代任非执行董事的企业估值和运营绩效更高，但后代任CEO时与无家族企业无显著差异。
Abstract We investigate the relation between ownership structure and firm performance in Continental Europe, using data from 675 publicly traded corporations in 11 countries. Although family‐controlled corporations exhibit larger separation between control and cash‐flow rights, our results do not support the hypothesis that family control hampers firm performance. Valuation and operating performance are significantly higher in founder‐controlled corporations and in corporations controlled by descendants who sit on the board as non‐executive directors. When a descendant takes the position of CEO, family‐controlled companies are not statistically distinguishable from non‐family firms in terms of valuation and performance.