The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival
研究发现，在公平披露规则实施前，分析师通过先发布乐观后发布悲观的盈利预测来讨好管理层，从而获得更多私有信息，提高预测准确性并降低被解雇风险。
ABSTRACT This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard‐to‐predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.