Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second‐Best in Health Care Markets
探讨医疗市场中竞争的性质和规范属性，指出在健康保险导致道德风险时，若保险市场竞争，则医疗市场的高价无法约束道德风险，消费者在低价下福利不差于高价。
The nature and normative properties of competition in health care markets have long been the subject of much debate. In this paper we consider what the optimal benchmark is in the presence of moral hazard effects on consumption due to health insurance. Intuitively, it seems that imperfect competition in the health care market may constrain this moral hazard by increasing prices. We show that this intuition cannot be correct if insurance markets are competitive. A competitive insurance market will always produce a contract that leaves consumers at least as well off under lower prices as under higher prices.