La Crema:A Case Study of Mutual Fire Insurance
分析了安道尔的一种相互火灾保险机制La Crema，发现只有所有家庭如实申报财产价值才能实现帕累托最优，但诚实并非均衡；随着社会规模增大，偏离诚实报告的收益消失，所有非退化均衡都接近诚实且近似帕累托最优。
We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on households' announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are apportioned among other households. The only Pareto-efficient allocation reachable through the mechanism requires that all households honestly report the true value of their property. However, such honest reporting is not an equilibrium except in the extreme case in which the property values are identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, the benefits from deviating from truthful reporting vanish, and all the nondegenerate equilibria of the mechanism are nearly truthful and approximately Pareto efficient.