Unintended Consequences of Lowering Disclosure Thresholds
通过实验发现，降低风险披露门槛可能产生两种意外后果：一是加入低概率风险会稀释投资者对高概率损失的感知，二是企业可能利用合规理由将披露包装成无关紧要的内容，从而降低投资者对整体风险的判断。
ABSTRACT In recent years, regulators have considered several initiatives to lower the threshold for disclosing risks to investors. We examine two ways in which disclosing more risks can actually lower investors' perceptions of risk. Utilizing an experiment, we find evidence of two unintended consequences on different types of investors. First, we demonstrate that the addition of low-probability risks to a disclosure can dilute (rather than add to) more probable losses, leading certain investors to lower their perceptions of overall risk. Second, since lowering the threshold changes the overall composition of the disclosure by adding low-probability losses, firms could adopt a tactic of minimization that characterizes the entire disclosure as unimportant, presenting the lowest risks most saliently, using compliance with the low threshold as a plausible reason for giving a lengthy disclosure of generally unimportant risks. Our findings suggest that such a tactic can be persuasive. Data Availability: Contact the authors.