A Theory of Organizational Dynamics: Internal Politics and Efficiency
研究一个三人组织在成员退休和投票补缺的动态过程中，不同投票规则（一致同意与多数投票）对长期福利的影响，发现一致同意投票更优，且适度分歧的组织表现更好。
We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality and belong to one of two types, and majority-type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting is better than majority voting at promoting long-term welfare. In addition, organizations with a certain degree of incongruity perform better in the long run than either harmonious or very divided organizations.