Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring*
构建了一个包含研发溢出、企业异质性和不完全合同的内生增长模型，研究离岸外包对增长、消费和福利的长期影响，发现上游议价权重与离岸外包正相关，但与增长呈倒U型关系，且不完全合同下需要生产补贴来纠正效率损失。
Abstract We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long‐run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.