Prosecution and Leniency Programs: The Role of Bluffing in Opening Investigations
研究了竞争主管机构在掌握卡特尔案件证据强弱不确定时，如何利用企业对被定罪风险的担忧，即使案件证据不足也能通过宽大政策获取认罪，并分析了宽大政策对调查成功率和卡特尔威慑力的影响。
This paper characterizes the optimal investigation and leniency policies when the Competition Authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case. I show that the Competition Authority can then exploit firms’ uncertainty about the risk of conviction to obtain confessions even when the case is weak. More generally, I show that offering full leniency allows the Competition Authority to open more successful investigations (what I refer to as the ‘activism effect’ of leniency), which overall raises both cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of the model.