Learning by Observing: Information Spillovers in the Execution and Valuation of Commercial Bank M&As
提出新解释：银行并购的价值创造难以被学术研究证实，是因为早期大型银行并购是新生事物，银行经理和投资者通过观察以往并购的信息溢出而学习。基于1987-1999年美国216起大型上市银行并购的证据支持这一观点。
ABSTRACT We offer a new explanation for why academic studies typically fail to find value creation in bank mergers. Our conjectures are predicated on the idea that, until recently, large bank acquisitions were a new phenomenon, with no best practices history to inform bank managers or market investors. We hypothesize that merging banks, and investors pricing bank mergers, learn by observing information that spills over from previous bank mergers. We find evidence consistent with these conjectures for 216 M&As of large, publicly traded U.S. commercial banks between 1987 and 1999. Our findings are consistent with semistrong stock market efficiency.