Optimal cash holdings under heterogeneous beliefs
研究了异质债权人信念下企业如何通过持有现金来激励悲观债权人投资，发现利率和现金持有是互补工具，在资本集中度高时现金持有更优。
Abstract This paper explores a one‐period model for a firm that finances its operations through debt provided by heterogeneous creditors. Creditors differ in their beliefs about the firm's investment outcomes. We show the existence of Stackelberg equilibria in which the firm holds cash reserves in order to provide incentives for pessimistic creditors to invest in the firm. We find interest rates and cash holdings to be complementary tools for increasing debt capacity. In markets with a high concentration of capital across a small interval of pessimistic creditors or by a few large creditors, cash holdings is the preferred tool to increase the debt capacity of the firm.