Financial Innovation, Collateral, and Investment
研究了金融创新如何通过改变抵押品承诺方式影响资产价格和投资，发现即使基本面不变，抵押品的使用也可能导致过度投资或投资不足。
Financial innovations that change how promises are collateralized affect prices and investment, even in the absence of any change in fundamentals. In C-models, the ability to leverage an asset always generates overinvestment compared to Arrow-Debreu. Credit Default Swaps always leads to underinvestment with respect to Arrow-Debreu, and in some cases even robustly destroy competitive equilibrium. The need for collateral would seem to cause under-investment. Our analysis illustrates a countervailing force: goods that serve as collateral yield additional services and can therefore be over-valued and over-produced. In models without cash flow problems there is never marginal underinvestment on collateral.