Bailouts, the Incentive to Manage Risk, and Financial Crises
分析企业面临破产时，外部利益相关者或债权人可能提供救助，这种隐性担保激励股东增加波动性以利用保护，但过度波动会迫使担保方放弃。模型推导出最优风险管理规则，能解释高风险选择及净值下降时风险限制收紧的现象。
A firm's termination leads to bankruptcy costs. This may create an incentive for outside stakeholders or the firm's debtholders to bail out the firm as bankruptcy looms. Because of this implicit guarantee, firm shareholders have an incentive to increase volatility in order to exploit the implicit protection. However, if they increase volatility too much they may induce the guarantee-extending parties to "walk away." I derive the optimal risk management rule in such a framework and show that it allows high volatility choices, while net worth is high. However, risk limits tighten abruptly when the firm's net worth declines below an endogenously determined threshold. Hence, the model reproduces the qualitative features of existing risk management rules, and can account for phenomena such as "flight to quality."