Negotiated Enforcement and Credible Deterrence
构建了一个执法模型，其中被起诉的违法者与检察官可在调查完成前协商处罚，分析了协商阶段如何影响最优执法政策，发现最大制裁可能并非最优，且协商会降低检察官深入调查的激励并提高违规率。
This paper develops a model of law enforcement in which indicted offenders and the prosecutor can negotiate the penalty prior to the completion of the investigation. The analysis focuses on the credibility of the conviction threat: the prosecutor cannot commit to any predetermined level of investigative effort should the negotiation fail. The settlement stage introduces several new features of the optimal enforcement policy, including the possibility that maximal sanctions may not be optimal. We show that the screening process associated with the negotiation stage reduces the incentives for the prosecutor to undertake thorough investigations and increases the rate of noncompliance.