Toward a Positive Theory of Disclosure Regulation: In Search of Institutional Foundations
构建了一个会计准则内生形成的理论模型，分析不同监管机构（如自律组织与民选政治家）对披露规则的影响，发现自律组织倾向于更全面的披露，而允许标准竞争能提升市场价值。
ABSTRACT This article develops a theory of standard-setting in which accounting standards emerge endogenously from an institutional bargaining process. It provides a unified framework with investment and voluntary disclosure to examine the links between regulatory institutions and accounting choice. We show that disclosure rules tend to be more comprehensive when controlled by a self-regulated professional organization than when they are under the direct oversight of elected politicians. These institutions may not implement standards desirable to diversified investors and, when voluntary disclosures are possible, allowing choice between competing standards increases market value over a single uniform standard. Several new testable hypotheses are also offered to explain differences in accounting regulations. JEL Classifications: C78; D02; D04; D71; D72; D79; G28; L51; M41; M48.