Do labor markets discipline? Evidence from RMBS bankers
研究了参与住房抵押贷款支持证券化的银行家是否在内部和外部劳动力市场受到惩戒，发现高级RMBS银行家并未遭受不利后果，暗示高层管理默许了相关活动。
This paper examines whether employees involved in residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) securitization experienced internal and external labor market consequences relative to similar non-RMBS employees in the same banks and why. Senior RMBS bankers experienced similar levels of job retention, promotion, and external job opportunities. Even signers of RMBS deals with high loss and misreporting rates or deals implicated in lawsuits experienced no adverse internal or external labor market outcomes. These findings are likely not explained by targeted or delayed employee discipline, small legal fines, or protection due to pending litigation but are consistent with implicit upper-management approval of RMBS activities.