CEO Noncompete Agreements, Job Risk, and Compensation
利用手工收集的CEO竞业禁止协议数据，研究发现竞业禁止协议在CEO预期工作流动性受限成本高时较少采用，而在企业担心竞争对手挖角损失大时更常见；同时，竞业禁止协议增强了离职与业绩的敏感性，并提高了总薪酬和激励薪酬。
Abstract Using hand-collected data on CEO noncompete agreements (NCAs), we find that NCAs are less common when CEOs expect to incur greater personal costs from reduced job mobility and more common when firms expect to suffer greater economic harm if departing CEOs leave to work for a competitor. Additionally, turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger when CEOs have NCAs. Finally, total compensation and incentive pay are higher if CEOs have more enforceable NCAs. Our identification strategy exploits staggered state-level changes in NCA enforceability. Overall, our findings suggest that restrictions on job mobility have important implications for how CEOs are monitored and compensated.