An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits
通过实验室实验比较拍卖与祖父制分配污染许可证的效果，发现拍卖能减少高排放者的市场势力、提高消费者剩余并消除暴利，而祖父制下许可证持有偏向高排放者。
We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution \npermits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for \npermits in the auction, whereas permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, \ntrading in the spot market should erase inefficiencies due to initial mis-allocations. In the \nexperiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market, and permit holdings under \ngrandfathering remain skewed towards high emitters. Furthermore, the opportunity costs of \n“free” permits are fully “passed through.” In the auction, the majority of permits arewon by low \nemitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher consumer surplus \nand slightly lower product prices in the laboratory markets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the \nlarge “windfall profits” that are observed in the treatment with free, grandfathered permit \nallocations.