Contingent Contracts in Banking: Insurance or Risk Magnification?
研究了银行在宏观经济冲击下使用或有存款和贷款合约的影响，发现当银行破产时私人部门能有效保险，但银行被救助时会导致风险放大和过度投资。
Abstract What happens when banks compete with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macro‐economic shocks? The private sector insures the banking system efficiently against crises through such contracts when failing banks go bankrupt. When risks are large, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors who receive state‐contingent contracts. In contrast, when failing banks are rescued, new phenomena such as risk magnification emerge. Depositors receive noncontingent contracts, while loan contracts demand high repayment in good times and low repayment in bad times. Banks overinvest and generate large macro‐economic risks, even if the underlying productivity risk is small or zero.