On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization
分析经济中资产使用决策的层级结构，探讨协调者与专业者的最优安排，解释为何协调者通常高于专业者、金字塔层级为何最优，并揭示企业内部最优分权程度与企业边界。
We consider an economy that has to decide how assets are to be used. Agents have ideas, but these ideas conflict. We suppose that decision‐making authority is determined by hierarchy: each asset has a chain of command, and the most senior person with an idea exercises authority. We analyze the optimal hierarchical structure given that some agents coordinate and other specialize. Among other things, our theory explains why coordinators should typically be senior to specialists and why pyramidal hierarchies may be optimal. Our theory also throws light on the optimal degree of decentralization inside a firm and on firm boundaries.