Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing
研究了双边金融合同的最优清算安排，其中评估交易对手信用风险对效率至关重要。通过中央对手方清算可以分散风险，但可能削弱信息获取和披露的激励，从而影响清算方式的选择。
This paper studies the optimal clearing arrangement for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty credit risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are subject to limited commitment and hold private information about the severity of such lack of commitment. Lenders can acquire information, at a cost, about the commitment of their borrowers, which affects the assessment of counterparty risk. Clearing through a central counterparty allows lenders to mutualize counterparty credit risk, but this insurance may weaken incentives to acquire and reveal information. If information acquisition is incentive‐compatible, then lenders choose central clearing. If it is not, they may prefer bilateral clearing either to prevent strategic default or to optimize the allocation of costly collateral.