Imperfect Renegotiations in Interbank Financial Networks
研究了银行间网络中，当一家银行资不抵债时，其他银行是否通过减免其债务来阻止危机扩散，发现两银行网络可行但三银行网络可能失败，并探讨了银行如何事前设计网络以减少这种低效损失。
Interbank financial networks enable banks to share the risks in their assets but potentially also increase systemic spillovers of insolvency from one bank to others in the network. We model a renegotiation game to explicitly examine the forgiveness of commitments of insolvent banks by solvent banks to limit the systemic transmission of financial distress. The assets of the insolvent bank can be appropriated by the forgiving bank in the two-bank network, but not the three-bank network, where they may be appropriated by the third bank, leading to a renegotiation breakdown. We also show how banks can ex ante optimally construct networks from interbank loans and derivatives to minimize the costs of such inefficient financial distress. This paper was accepted by Itay Goldstein, finance.