Direct Democracy and Public Employees
研究直接民主制度（倡议程序）能否改善公共部门因庇护和利益集团导致的就业和工资过高问题。基于650多个城市数据，发现倡议在无集体谈判时削减就业，在有集体谈判时削减工资。
In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests.