Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle
理论认为银行利用借款人私有信息在衰退期提高利率，本文通过比较依赖银行与能进入公开债务市场的借款人的贷款定价，发现后者在衰退期支付的利差更低且上升幅度更小。
ABSTRACT Theory suggests that banks' private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since hold‐up power increases with borrower risk, banks with exploitable information should be able to raise their rates in recessions by more than is justified by borrower risk alone. We test this hypothesis by comparing the pricing of loans for bank‐dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for borrowers with access to public debt markets, controlling for risk factors. Loan spreads rise in recessions, but firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions.