Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games
研究了一组代理人随时间付出成本推进项目的博弈，设计了一个预算平衡机制，在马尔可夫完美均衡下实现每个代理人的最优努力水平，从而消除搭便车问题，并展示了该机制如何适用于其他动态外部性博弈。
We analyze a game in which a group of agents exerts costly effort over time to make progress on a project. The project is completed once the cumulative effort reaches a prespecified threshold, at which point it generates a lump-sum payoff. We characterize a budget-balanced mechanism that induces each agent to exert the first-best effort level as the outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium, thus eliminating the free-rider problem. We also show how our mechanism can be adapted to other dynamic games with externalities, such as strategic experimentation and the dynamic extraction of a common resource.