Efficiency, equity, and social rationality under uncertainty
在代理人货币收益不确定的简单模型中，从效率、事后公平和社会理性等公理推导出最大最小社会福利准则，该准则通过状态最小收益的确定性等价来比较分配，具有平等主义和风险厌恶特征。
Abstract In a simple model where agents’ monetary payoffs are uncertain, this paper examines the aggregation of subjective expected utility functions which are interpersonally noncomparable. A maximin social welfare criterion is derived from axioms of efficiency, ex post equity, and social rationality, combined with the independence of beliefs and risk preferences in riskless situations (Chambers and Echenique in Games Econ Behav 76:582–595, 2012). The criterion compares allocations by the values of the prospects composed of the statewise minimum payoffs evaluated by the certainty equivalents. Because of this construction, the criterion is egalitarian and risk averse.