Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses
分析了11家风险投资公司对67项投资的分析报告，将风险分为三类，并探讨其与现金流权、控制权等合同条款的关系，发现代理问题和套牢问题对合同设计和监控重要，但风险分担不重要。
ABSTRACT We study the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs describe the strengths and risks of the investments as well as expected postinvestment actions. We classify the risks into three categories and relate them to the allocation of cash flow rights, contingencies, control rights, and liquidation rights between VCs and entrepreneurs. The risk results suggest that agency and hold‐up problems are important to contract design and monitoring, but that risk sharing is not. Greater VC control is associated with increased management intervention, while greater VC equity incentives are associated with increased value‐added support.