Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions
研究发现，向家长提供孩子的出勤信息能显著提高出勤率，效果接近现金转移支付；直接激励孩子（掌握完全信息）至少与激励家长同样有效。
Many countries use CCTs targeted to parents to promote schooling. Attendance conditions may work through two channels: incentivization and information. If children have private information, (i) providing attendance information to parents may increase attendance inexpensively relative to CCTs and (ii) it may be more effective to incentivize children, who have full information, than parents. Tackling both questions in a unified experimental setting, we find that information alone improves parental monitoring and has a large effect relative to our CCT. Incentivizing children is at least as effective as incentivizing parents––importantly, not because parents were able to appropriate transfers to children.