Fixed Prices and Regulatory Discretion as Triggers for Contingent Capital Conversion: An Experimantal Examination
通过实验室实验，比较了基于价格的两种或有资本债券转换触发机制：监管者裁量和固定价格触发，发现转换对现有股权价值的影响不同时，两种机制的错误率各有优劣。
We report a laboratory experiment that evaluates two price-based mechanisms for triggering the conversion of contingent-capital bonds into equity: a regulator who decides based on observed prices and a mechanistic fixed-price trigger. We find that when conversion decreases incumbent equity value, the regulator mechanism generates fewer conversion errors, particularly in environments where incentives bias a regulator against conversion and where a regulator receives his own signal. In contrast, when conversion increases incumbent equity value, a fixed-price trigger generates fewer conversion errors in these environments as well as when the regulator has the option to delay conversion.