Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?
检验敌意收购与友好收购在会计和股票表现上是否有实质区别，发现多数被媒体称为敌意的交易在经济上与友好交易无异，只是敌意交易在谈判中更依赖公开宣传。
This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers result from replacing incumbent managers and gains from friendly takeovers result from strategic synergies. Alternatively, hostility could reflect strategic choices made by the bidder or the target. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, except that hostile transactions involve publicity as part of the bargaining process.