Skin in the Game versus Skimming the Game: Governance, Share Restrictions, and Insider Flows
研究发现份额限制会引发基金经理与投资者之间的利益冲突，份额受限基金的资金流动能预测未来收益，且治理水平低的基金中经理可能利用信息优势提前交易。
Abstract This paper advances the proposition that share restrictions engender potential conflicts of interest between fund managers and investors. Fund flows predict future fund returns for share-restricted funds, especially among funds with low levels of governance and funds managing insiders’ wealth, providing managers incentive to trade in advance of their clients. Some direct evidence for such managerial action is presented, using proprietary data on managerial investment in their own funds. The evidence suggests that private information about a fund, not necessarily its holdings, may constitute material information, with implications for proper fund governance and disclosure policy concerning managerial actions.