Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
用重复博弈模型解释企业内部（纵向一体化）与企业间（非一体化）的关系合同为何不同，以及一体化如何影响双方维持关系合同的能力，对合资、联盟等组织形式有启示。
Relational contracts—informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships—are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (nonintegration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship. Our approach also has implications for joint ventures, alliances, and networks, and for the role of management within and between firms.