Heterogeneity of Reference Effects in the Competitive Newsvendor Problem
证明了报童问题中两种参考效应公式的数学等价性，并扩展到竞争环境，发现参考效应的异质性可以解释实验中的多种规律，如利润差异和订货偏差。
This paper demonstrates the mathematical equivalence between two recently proposed reference effect formulations for the newsvendor problem and then extends them to a competitive setting. The analysis of the resultant game shows that the heterogeneity of reference effects can explain multiple regularities observed in recent experimental studies of newsvendor competition. In particular, our model explains the main experimental finding that one newsvendor tends to ignore the policy of its competitor. Other experimental observations such as profit disparity, underordering in a high margin scenario, and overordering when there is no expected overflow can all be attributed to the heterogeneity of reference effects in our model’s equilibrium. In addition to explaining these observations, our model also produces a number of new testable hypotheses regarding the competitive newsvendor behavior.