Managerial Risk‐Taking Incentives and Executive Stock Option Repricing: A Study of US Casino Executives
研究美国博彩业公司高管持有股票和期权带来的激励与期权重新定价的关系，发现期权带来的风险承担激励越高，公司越可能重新定价，以缓解高管过度冒险的倾向。
I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects. Repricing may alleviate such incentives. I examine repricing activity by firms in the US gaming industry and find that risk‐taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results support the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk‐taking incentives of senior management.