A RENT EXTRACTION THEORY OF RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL*
将优先购买权建模为一种修改后的拍卖，权利持有者可在观察第三方出价后出价，发现该权利通过减少第三方利润来增加卖方与权利持有者的联合利润，且结果独立于第三方是否知情及是否造成福利损失。
When a seller encumbers a property with a right of first refusal, whenever a third party offers to purchase the property, the right‐holder can acquire the property by simply matching the third party's offer. I model the right as a modified auction where the right‐holder gets to observe the third party's bid before making his own. I show that, compared to the standard auctions, the right increases the joint profit of the seller and the right‐holder by reducing the third party's profit. This result is independent of whether the third party is aware of the right's existence and whether the right creates a welfare loss.