股利与侵占

Dividends and Expropriation

American Economic Review · 2001
被引 1673 · 同刊同年前 3%
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

比较东亚和欧洲家族控制企业的股利政策,发现欧洲关联企业股利更高以抑制内部人侵占,而多个大股东在欧洲抑制侵占、在亚洲却加剧侵占。

Abstract

Whereas most U.S. corporations are widely held, the predominant form of ownership in East Asia is control by a family, which often supplies a top manager. These features of “crony capitalism” are actually more pronounced in Western Europe. In both regions, the salient agency problem is expropriation of outside shareholders by controlling shareholders. Dividends provide evidence on this. Group-affiliated corporations in Europe pay higher dividends than in Asia, dampening insider expropriation. Dividend rates are higher in Europe, but lower in Asia, when there are multiple large shareholders, suggesting that they dampen expropriation in Europe, but exacerbate it in Asia.

股利掏空控股股东公司治理