Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions
分析美国林务局木材拍卖中企业的私有信息如何影响投标行为，发现投标者利用私有信息获取信息租金，但竞争限制了租金规模。
This paper analyzes the role of private information in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. In these auctions, firms bid a per unit price for each timber species. Total bids are computed by multiplying these prices by Forest Service volume estimates, but payments depend on actual volumes harvested. We develop an equilibrium theory for these auctions. We then relate (ex post) data about volume to (ex ante) bids. We show that bidders have private information about volumes of species and use it as predicted by theory. Differences in bidder estimates appear to affect the allocation of tracts, but competition limits information rents.