Optimal Procurement Mechanisms for Assembly
研究原始设备制造商如何从成本信息私有的供应商处采购装配所需的多项投入品，发现最优机制要求采购量匹配，并提出用两部收费菜单实现非依赖合同，同时证明同时与顺序采购机制收益等价。
This paper investigates mechanisms by which a powerful original equipment manufacturers procures multiple inputs for assembly from suppliers with privately informed costs, either simultaneously or sequentially. The optimal mechanisms always lead to matching purchase quantities of the inputs. Thus, quantity–payment contracts that implement the optimal mechanisms are contingent across suppliers (i.e., each supplier’s contract terms contain other suppliers’ private costs as variables), making the implementation impractical. To address this issue, we propose alternative implementations of the optimal mechanisms by menus of two-part tariff contracts that are noncontingent. In addition, optimal simultaneous and sequential procurement mechanisms for assembly are shown to be revenue-equivalent for all parties despite their different asymmetric information structures. Our findings suggest that procurement managers need not strategize contracting sequences for assembly, but should rather focus on achieving the best pricing with each supplier and coordinating purchase quantities.