Legal Standards, Enforcement, and Corruption
研究了法律标准与执法成本的关系，发现仁慈政府的最优标准随人均收入上升、随官员腐败下降，而自利政府的选择则非单调。跨国环境规制数据支持模型预测。
Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Because enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per capita income and decreasing in officials ’ cor-ruption. In contrast to the “tollbooth view ” of regulation, the standard chosen by a self-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials ’ corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a benevolent regulator. International evidence on environmental reg-ulation shows that standards correlate positively with per-capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistent with the model’s predictions for benevolent governments. 1.