Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
扩展夏普利值理论以处理外部性问题，利用标准公理系统确定玩家收益的边界，并基于外部性性质推导出类似庇古转移的方向和最大规模，附有示例并与前人文献比较。
Our concern is the extension of the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value leads to the identification of bounds on players' payoffs around an "externality-free" value. The approach determines the direction and maximum size of Pigouvian-like transfers among players, transfers based on the specific nature of externalities that are compatible with basic normative principles. Examples are provided to illustrate the approach and to draw comparisons with previous literature.