DECIDING ON WHAT TO DECIDE
研究两阶段集体决策程序：第一阶段部分选民决定议程上的议题，第二阶段全体选民对议题立场投票。发现两种常见投票规则下几乎任何议题集都可成为均衡议程，且主席可能操纵顺序投票使某些议题无法进入议程。
Abstract We study two‐stage collective decision‐making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol‐free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.