Customer Concentration and Earnings Management: Evidence from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
研究客户集中度如何影响萨班斯-奥克斯利法案对盈余管理的效果，发现低客户集中度的公司更显著减少了应计盈余管理，且关系专用性投资强化了这一效应。
This paper investigates whether the level of customer concentration can moderate the effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on the earnings management of U.S. corporations. Large customers can act as a mechanism for reducing agency problems by pressuring supplier firms to be more efficient. Large customers may act as certifying agents for a supplier, and they may reduce information asymmetries about the supplier. These two channels suggest that customer concentration may affect corporate earnings management and hence generate heterogeneity in the effects of SOX. This paper documents that SOX has led firms with low customer concentration to reduce accrual-based earnings management more than those with high customer concentration have. The effect of customer concentration is especially pronounced when firms are involved in higher relationship-specific investments. The results are robust to accounting for endogeneity and alternative measures of discretionary accruals and customer concentration.