An Investigation of the Gains from Specialized Equity Claims
研究母公司不放弃控制权时，对子公司发行可交易股权是否改善经营绩效。结果发现，只有完全剥离子公司股权时母公司绩效才提升，而发行追踪股票无改善效果。
We investigate whether operating performance improves when a firm creates traded equity claims on a subsidiary without relinquishing control. We find that the change in a parent firm’s operating performance following an equity carve-out is negatively related to the fraction of subsidiary shares that the parent firm retains after a carve-out. Operating performance of parent firms improves only when the parent completely divests its ownership of the subsidiary. We also find no improvement in operating performance following the creation of tracking stock. We conclude that corporate restructuring without relinquishing control of assets does not enhance operating performance.