The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
研究2004年委内瑞拉查韦斯政府将反对者选民名单分发给官僚机构后，被标记为政治反对者的选民收入下降5%，就业率下降1.3个百分点。
In 2004, the Hugo Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters who had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chávez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chávez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.3 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released.