Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability
构建了一个包含商业银行向影子银行转移风险贷款、金融中介交易证券化资产的宏观经济模型，解释了产出、传统银行和影子银行信贷的周期联动，以及影子银行流动性危机中的宏观变量行为。
Abstract We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.