Visibility Bias in the Transmission of Consumption Beliefs and Undersaving
研究了消费行为社会传播中的可见性偏差，即消费比非消费更显眼导致人们高估他人消费并推断前景乐观，从而加剧过度消费和储蓄不足，并指出信息披露政策可改善储蓄不足。
ABSTRACT We model visibility bias in the social transmission of consumption behavior. When consumption is more salient than nonconsumption, people perceive that others are consuming heavily, and infer that future prospects are favorable. This increases aggregate consumption in a positive feedback loop. A distinctive implication is that disclosure policy interventions can ameliorate undersaving. In contrast with wealth‐signaling models, information asymmetry about wealth reduces overconsumption. The model predicts that saving is influenced by social connectedness, observation biases, and demographic structure, and provides new insight into savings rates. These predictions are distinct from other common models of consumption distortions.