JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES*
重新审视了工作搜寻模型中无记忆的假设，发现能回忆并让之前雇主参与伯特兰竞标的工人具有优势，企业会因此调整报价，从而打破戴蒙德悖论。
This article revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds. © (2011) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.