Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks
研究发现2000年左右美国大型商业银行CEO的冒险激励增加，这与行业放松管制扩大了增长机会有关；CEO对此有正向反应，但董事会会在风险过高时调整激励，不过最大银行缺乏这种反馈。
Abstract We show that contractual risk-taking incentives for chief executive officers (CEOs) increased at large U.S. commercial banks around 2000, when industry deregulation expanded these banks’ growth opportunities. Our econometric models indicate that CEOs responded positively to these incentives, especially at the larger banks best able to take advantage of these opportunities. Our results also suggest that bank boards responded to higher-than-average levels of risk by moderating CEO risk-taking incentives; however, this feedback effect is absent at the very largest banks with strong growth opportunities and a history of highly aggressive risk-taking incentives.