Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union
研究货币联盟货币政策委员会在成员由各国政治家任命时，是否应公布投票记录。发现公布投票记录会降低整体福利，即使考虑任职私人利益和更换成本。
We examine whether the monetary policy committee of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare. This finding also holds for arbitrary levels of private benefits from holding office and if governments incur costs when replacing committee members. High private benefits of committee members always lower overall welfare, as they induce nonpartisan members to care more about being reappointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. Nonrenewable but long terms for national committee members and delegating the appointment of all committee members to a union‐wide authority would be desirable.